Module 1: [Aug 25-Aug 30] The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the theory of cooperation.

Aug 25 (W): 1. Course introduction. What the course is about, and how it will work. Expectations. Course administration. The problem of cooperation, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

- Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, revised edition (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 3-12, Axelrod 1984, 3-12.pdf
- In class: repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma experiment
- Google Doc for use in class, also linked under Collaborations tab
- Session 1 slides for introduction, course administration: Session 1~Course Admin.pptx

Aug 30 (M): 2. Repeated interaction and reciprocity in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Collective action among a large number of players. Coordination problems.

- Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, revised edition (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 3-54, 124-141, Axelrod, 3-54, 124-141.pdf

Discussion: anytime until the start of the first class session in the next module, post in the Module 1 Discussion Thread if you have questions about the readings, want to highlight a current events example of a point that is related, or to react to another's student's post constructively. Or post your 'muddiest point' - something that confused you most from one of these class sessions. This is optional but will count towards your participation points for the whole semester as noted in the syllabus.

In-Class Whiteboard: [from Session 2] Session 2 Board.pdf

Session Activity Log: Google Doc

Recordings: Session 1 (Aug 25); Session 2 (Aug 30)

Your workflow for any upcoming session:

Look at the learning objectives and discussion questions for the next upcoming session
Do the readings for the upcoming session before it meets
Revisit the learning objectives & discussion questions - can you meet or answer them?
Check in on the module discussion thread: post questions, or comments - Module 1 Discussion
Attend class and participate
Check back in on the same module discussion thread: post about your 'muddiest point,' the issue or idea you were most confused about from the past session, or a follow-up comment you want to make in response to something that came up in discussion

In Session 1 We Will...

Get to know each other
Answer questions about the expectations and administration of the course
Describe and explain the assumptions and logic of the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), a principal metaphor for explaining conflict and cooperation
Conduct in-class, live Prisoner's Dilemmas with classmates, for extra credit points
Draw conclusions from your own hands-on experience about sources of and impediments to cooperation in the PD setting
Describe the difference between normative and positive approaches to knowledge and apply those approaches in analyzing the Prisoner's Dilemma

Session 1 Discussion Questions

What is the Prisoner's Dilemma story, and the confines of this setting as a metaphor for social conflict and cooperation? What are its assumptions, and how valid do you think they are?
What is the expected outcome of a one-time Prisoner's Dilemma played between rational, self-interested actors? Explain the logic.
What are some possible ways people could use to escape this PD trap?
What was the outcome of your Prisoner Dilemma games? Why did you behave the way you did? Did your partner do what you expected? How much cooperation was there between you, and what do you think explains the outcome overall, in relation to other pairs' outcomes?
Normative: is the Prisoner's Dilemma, or its outcome, or its 'prescribed, optimal strategy' either "just" or "fair"? A Jason Isbell song, "Different Days," has the line, "The right thing's always the hardest thing to do." Is that the case in a Prisoner's Dilemma?
Positive: what might explain the emergence of cooperative behavior in a Prisoner's Dilemma? What role might be played in shaping this system by differences in identity/ethnicity, asymmetries of power, the initiatives of political entrepreneurs, grassroots mobilization efforts, etc.?

In Session 2 We Will...

Discuss Axelrod's PD experiments, the nature of those results, and the explanations behind them
Apply the PD and repeated PD concepts to a variety of real-world social and political problems
Explain and critique Axelrod's generalizing conclusions about the best ways to promote cooperation in a repeated PD setting
Learn about the definition and concept of a collective action problem, public goods, and free riding
Explain the logic of collective action problems and compare to Prisoner's Dilemmas
Learn and apply Olson's hypotheses about the sources of cooperation and collective action in collective goods problems
Describe a 'coordination problem' and how it is different from, yet related to, a Prisoner's Dilemma, and analyze the implications of that concept for bargaining and social outcomes

Session 2 Discussion Questions

Axelrod conducted a PD experiment, which the reading discusses. What was the nature of that experiment? How did it work? What about the nature of that experiment strikes you as useful for generalization, or not so useful, and why?
What were the result of Axelrod's experiment? Explain them. What features characterize the winning strategy?
How might cooperation 'evolve' as per Axelrod's book title, as apart from 'winning' a given PD tournament?
What is the 'best' strategy to use when playing a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, and why? What conditions are required, if any, for your claim to be true?
Can you think of real-world applications of the PD or repeated PD, as Axelrod has described it for us?
How would a PD play out if there were more than two individuals making that interactive decision?
What is a collective action problem, and how does it compare to a PD?
What is free riding, and when is it more likely in a collective action problem? Why would individuals be likely to free ride?
What conditions make collective action more likely? How might the size of the group, its degree of hierarchy and institutionalization, etc., matter?
The Prisoner's Dilemma assumes that each party gains equally from cooperation. What if that was not true, and there were multiple forms of cooperation that benefited the parties differently (albeit still more than mutual defection)? How would this affect the one-time outcome, and the outcome in a repeated game, and why? Can you think of examples of this kind of social dilemma in practice?